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Executive Summary
The paper assesses the capacity and financial performance of a sample of
microfinance institutions (Mils) operating in the Philippines. It has the follow-
ing objectives: (a) explain the microfinance policy environment in the country;
(b) evaluate the institutional and financial capacity and performance of MFIs; (c)
determine the issues and constraints affecting capacity and performance; and (d)
recommend measures to strengthen the MFIs. The motivating philosophy of this
paper is that unless MFIs become viable and sustainable financial institutions,
they can never fully realize their objective of reaching a greater number of poor
people, much less sustain the effort over the long term.
Banks rarely lend, if at all, to the poor, mostly because of information prob-
lems, high credit risk perception, lack of acceptable collateral and the high trans-
action costs of processing small loans. The government's response was to create a
number of credit programs intended to provide the poor with access to financial
services. The National Credit Council reports as many as 111 credit programs of
which 13 are targeted to the ultra-poor. Despite the government's credit pro-
grams, the poor's access to microfinancial services persists. The private sector
approach is to use MFIs such as credit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
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rural banks, cooperative rural banks and credit unions cooperatives to reach
the poor. However, the MFIs weak institutional capacity, lack of a viable and
extensive delivery system, a small financial base and the huge investments m
training clients hamper their attempts to reach a greater number of the target
clientele. In the very short run, the MFIs may be able to expand their present
reach, but because they are not viable and sustai'nable financial in.stitutions, the
effort cannot besustained.
The paper addresses four areas that will enable MFIs to be self-sustaining
financial institutions serving the poor. These four areas are as follows: (a) out-
reach and impact; (b) viability and sustainability; (c) resource mobilization; and
(d) policy.
Expanding outreach
Outreach remains small and limited although the poor borrowers and savers
predominate among MFI clientele, indicating an ahnost exclusive focus on the
poor. This shows the effectiveness of the targeting mechanism used by the MFIs
in identijiding poor clients. The weak institutional capacity, the lack of an exten-
sive and viable delivery system and a relatively small financial base prevent
MFIs, especially credit NGOs, from reaching a greater number of clients.
The principal problem faced by credit NGOs is the lack of legal personalitad
and authority to act as realfinancial intermediaries. This also results in a vera d
limited capacity to develop and legally offer innovative financial products. More
importantly, the informality of their organization makes illegal any attempt to
mobilize deposits, develop various financial products and offer them to the pub-
lic. The second problem is the lack of an extensive and viable financial delivery
system that has substantial focus on the poor. While the rural banks and the
credit cooperatives have a nationwide deliveray system through branches and unit
entities, they have yet to consider microfinancial markets as profitable opportuni-
ties. On the other hand, motivation of MFIs' staff to work with poor clients is not
wan ting but the MFIs face problems of rapid staff turnover.
Another problem area is the training of potential clients which represents a
sizable investment cost that the MFIs may not beable to absorb. The paper makes a
point that training of clients has some public good characteristics which makes it
worthy of governmen t and donor assistance. Matching government/donor Jhlnds
with MFI fimds for training may lead to better outreach performance because of the
risk-sharing involved.
Thus, we recommend thefollozoing:
• transform credit NGOs into full-pledged formal financial institutions,
e.g, private bank, finance company, nonstock savings and loan associa-
tion or credit cooperative;LLANTO et al.: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 3
• alternatively, credit NGOs may organize or invest in formal financial
institutions,
• promote linkage banking with private banks which are interested in
providing microfinance services for the poor through the MFls whose
institutional capacity must be upgraded;
• invest in training existing rural banks, cooperative rural banks and credit
unions cooperatives in microfinance technologies;
• externalize the training costs of the poor by providing MFIs access to
grants and government financial assistance, but following the principle
of matching grants with MFI own funds;
• continue staff training and the development of career paths for capable
workers, and upgrade pay scales and incentive schemes to retain good
personnel; and
• rationalize government credit programs and reallocate existing funds
for livelihood projects to capacity building and training of existing
MFIs.
MFI viability and sustainability
To continue providing financial service to the poor on a sustaining basis, the
MFIs themselves must be viable and sustainable. The paper shows that many of
the MFIs are far from attaining this goal. A major factor determining viability
and sustainability is the set of internal financial policies and organizational
practices and procedures observed by the MFIs. Internal financial policies and
practices need a lot of improventent, particularly in the installation of sound
financial reporting and monitoring systems, portfolio management, assessment
and management of risks, product packaging and pricing, management of loan
arrears and strategic business planning. Related to these will be the need to
upgrade and institutionalize performance standards, particularly in loan repay-
ment, appreciation of loan default and aging of delinquent accounts, and the
installation of appropriate accounting and internal audit systems. In addition,
the capability for governance, leadership and management affects their perfor-
mance. Improvement of management skills and professionalization of staff, ap-
propriate, market-oriented pricing offinancial products and services, and greater
effort in loan recovery are needed to make the MFIs viable and sustainable,
Thus, the key issue is building sustainable institutions by having (a) the
appropriate organizational form; (b) a strong equity and financial base; and (c)
suitable systems and procedures.4 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
We recommend thefollowing:
• build up the equity base of MFIs by infusing more capital from existing
owners and new investors;
° diversifid loans, savings and other financial products according
to client demand;
• maximize savings mobilization opportunih'es;
• promote training in financial operations, resource mobilization, portfo-
lio management, risk assessment and management, product packaging
and pricing, management of loan arrears, strategic and business plan-
ning, among others;
• improve systems and procedures such as automating systems and operat-
ing procedures, upgrading and institutionalizing performance standards,
setting up internal audit systems, conducting periodic management
audits, installing updated and standardized accounting and reporting
system; and
° professionalize the management and staffofMFIs.
Resource mobilization
The MFIs have all attempted to mobilize resources but the informal character
of their organization hampers the effort. Resources used are mostly grants and
subsidies coming from donors and the government which ironically stunt their
growth into viable and sustainable financial intermediaries. To stay competitive
and viable, the MFIs must raise substantial deposits and develop various instru-
ments, especiaUy for the small savers, which will help them build up their finan-
cial base. Thus, they have not only to mobilize traditional deposits but also seek
to broaden and deepen the financial products and services offered to meet existing
demand at the lower end of the -financial market. Broadening and deepening
mean the development of new product lines and services, the design and imple-
mentation of new microfinance technologies, and practices which will strengthen
their financial base.
We recommend the following:
° to the MFIs--get the appropriate legal personality/authority to be able to
mobilize deposits, raise equity capital and offer various financial prod-
ucts/services,
• invest in the development of new product lines and services, new
microfinance technologies, adaptation of the "best practices in
microfinance," etc., with counterpart funding from donors and the gov-
ernment;LLANTO et al.: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 5
* to the govera_ncnt, r_¢all,ocate,resources in the government's various live-
'tihood programs for the broadening and deepening of microfinancial
services; and
• to the donors--allocate resources for the broadening and deepening of
microfinancial services instead of providing loanablefunds-to MFIs.
Policy context
The necessity of bringing credit NGOs under a supervisory and regulatory
framezoork cannot be overemphasized. Without such aframework, the following
problems will persist: absence of performance standards, lack of uniformity and
dilution of standards of cfedit evaluation, lack of portfolio supervision leading to
poor loan recovery and detemoration of its quality and absence of prudential
regulations over such activities as deposit taking. The installation of a supervi-
sorlj and regulaton d framework complements the building of the institutional
capacity of MFls, especially the credit NGOs. In this way, we will have strong
MFIs which will no longer operate in apolicy vacuum.
The alternative to a formal supervisory and regulatory framework is
self-regulation by the credit NGOs. The argument goes that maintaining an
informal self-regulatory framework will provide the credit NGOs with flexibility
and room for initiative on various financial innovations to reach the poor. Fur-
thermore, there will be no danger of losing focus on their target clientele which
•will be brought about by the transformation qfcredit NGOs to fornzal financial
institutions. However, this paper points out the glaring need for performance
standards, prudential regulations, etc., in short, a supervisory frame-
work that will ensure the safety and soundness of those institutions and the
integrity of their transactions. The argument on losing focus on the poor does not
hold water. It is because an organization's vision, mission and goal are not
dictated by the organizational structure, e.g., banking firm, but by the people
manning it and the policies being pursued.
The transformation into format financial institutions may not be everybody's
cup of tea. It is not for every NGO. There will be some which wiU choose to
transform, but there will be others which will opt to remain as a development
agency and, perhaps, organize a bank, with a distinct charter, character and
fimction. The important outcome of this strategy is the unbundling of banking and
development￿social preparation functions which will increase efficiencies in the
financial markets for the poor because the (NGO) development agency and the
NGO-organized bank institution can exploit their respective compara-
tive advantage. From the public policy perspective, it becomes clearer what activi-
ties in microfinance programs for the poor properly constitute "social development
costs" and what should rightly be considered "cost of providing the financial
service," i.e., cost of doing business. Thefirst set of costs may besubsidized or given
access togrants in view of the externalities present in social training￿preparation of6 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
poor clients while the latter should be covered by appropriate pricing of the
,financial product. For the social development costs, the present thrust of raising
private monies must besupported.
We recommend the foUowing:
• to the government--provide for an appropriate supervisory and regula-
tory framework for MFIs, especially credit NGOs;
• to the NGOs-maintain a dialogue with the government on the installa-
tion of an appropriate supervison d and regulatory framework for MFls;
• to the government-support the costs of social preparation￿training
through budgetary assistance that will be matched by private sector
funds; and
• to donorswprovide assistance to social preparation activities, develop-
ment of microfinance products, training in microfinance technologies,
and upgrading of performance standards, operating systems and proce-
dures.LLANTOet al.:MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 7
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is an assessment of the capacity and financial
performance of a sample of microfinance institutions (MFIs) op-
erating in the Philippines. It has the following objectives: (a)
explain the microfinance policy environment in the country; (b)
evaluate the institutional and financial capacity and performance
of MFIs; (c) determine the issues and constraints affecting ca-
pacity and performance; and (d) recommend measures to
strengthen the MFIs. The motivating philosophy of this report is
that, unless MFIs become viable and sustainable financial insti-
tutions, they can never fully realize their objective of reaching a
greater number of poor people, much less sustaining the effort.
The paper has four sections. The next section is a brief over-
view of recent developments in the country and the policy con-
text of microfinance programs. Section III analyzes the main
findings from case studies of MFIs and discusses the main issues
and constraints affecting their capacity and financial perfor-
mance. The last section concludes and recommends policy and
institutional measures to strengthen MFIs and the implementa-
tion of microfinance programs in the country.
A chief limitation of this paper is the use of a purposive
sample of seven MFIs to arrive at the analysis; conclusions and
recommendations made. Drawing a larger and random sample
of MFIs would have been ideal but time and budget constraints
prevented it. Nevertheless, we believe that despite the limitation
imposed by the available data and information set, the analysis,
conclusions and recommendations have a great degree of valid-
ity because the sample MFIs are among those which have oper-
ated in the last several years. We assume that their performance
largely reflects the general experience of MFIs.8 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
II. OVERVIEW OF THE COUNTRY AND
POLICY CONTEXT
1. Dimensions of Poverty, its Distribution and
Incidence
Because poverty is such a pervasive problem in the Philip-
pines, the government's development efforts in recent years fo-
cused on poverty alleviation and the improvement of income
distribution, yielding modest gains in the war against poverty.
The National Statistics Office reports that the poverty incidence
declined by 4 percentage points from 1985 to 1988. The decline
continued to 1994 with a poverty incidence of 35.7 percent com-
pared to 39.9 percent in 1991. Based on the 1994 Family Income
and Expenditure Survey, the total number of poor households
decreased from 4.78 million in 1991 to 4.56 million in 1994.
On the other hand, there was also a decline in the total
number of subsistence households from 2.45 million in 1991 to
2.32 million in 1994. There was a marked decline in urban F-_V-
erty incidence from 35.6 percent in 1991 to 28.8 percent in 1994.
Rural poverty incidence declined only slightly from 55.1 percent
in 1991 to 53.7 percent in 1994. In addition to the magnitude of
poverty, the government has also to contend with the highly
inequitable distribution of income. However, there was an im-
provement in income distribution with a decline in Gini ratio
from 0.468 in 1991 to 0.454 in 1994.1
Despite the government's well-intentioned effort, a very sub-
stantial number of households, especially in the rural areas,
struggle tomeet the basic food and nonfood requirements of
decent living. In the rural areas, the incidence of poverty was
highest at about two-thirds among farming and fishing families,
while those in all occupations other than farming, forestry, fishing
and agricultural services had an incidence of poverty of a little
under two-fifths (Srinivasan 1993). Within agriculture, among
1. National Anti-Poverty Summit, Philippine International Convention Center,
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the poorest were farm workers in sugarcane, rice, corn, coconut
and forestry, and growers of coconut, corn and miscellaneous
crops, as well as fishermen. A large number of the poor are in the
rural agricultural sector. 2 Effective and efficient poverty allevia-
tion efforts directed at this sector (for instance, by expanding the
off-farm employment opportunities of rural households) will sig-
nificantly reduce poverty incidence in the country (Intal 1993).
2. Macroeconomic Considerations
Over the past five years, the country's annual real GNP
growth averaged at 3.4 percent (Table II-1). Per capita GNP,
however, hardly grew as population over the same period grew
roughly as fast (2.6 percent). The country's GDP for 1995 was
valued at P1,905.3 billion ($74,135 million). Per capita GDP was
posted at P27,114 ($1,055). Year-end average inflation rates have
been single-digit (ranging from 7.6 percent to 9.8 percent) after
a high double-digit average of 18.7 percent in 1991. For 1995,
the average inflation rate was 8.1 percent. The policy and struc-
tural reforms under the Aquino and Ramos administrations have
put the economy in the growth path after the crisis years of the
1980s. Investor confidence in the Philippine economy came back,
together with domestic capital which took off for foreign shores
during the Marcos regime. The renewed vigor of the economy
led the Ramos administration to announce that its last few years
in power would be focused on poverty alleviation and on the
continuation of policy reforms.
In the financial sector, the creation of a new Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP) in 1995 strengthened the formal financial sys-
tem. The BSP pursued the financial reforms started in the 1980s,
and recently, it relaxed the rigid bank entry and branching policy
that it strictly implemented in the past. The financial sector was
further liberalized by allowing the entry of foreign banks. The re-
2. See the various papers by A. Balisacan (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) for a
thorough and comprehensive analysis of the poverty situation in the Philippines.TABLE IM
Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 1991-1995
°AtAnnual
It em 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Growth
Gross National Product (PM)
at current prices 1,266,070 1,385,562 1,500,287 1,737,315 1,970,519 11.74
at constant 1985 prices 726,819 737,139 746,921 786,347 831,434 3.44
Per Capita GNP (P)
at current prices 20,079 21,394 22,399 25,318 28,042 8.76
at constant 1985 prices 11,489 11,358 11,151 11,459 11,832 0.76 O
Gross Domestic Product (PM)
at current prices 1,248,011 1,351,559 1,474,457 1,693,865 1,905,266 11.19
at constant 1985 prices 716,522 718,941 734,156 766,579 803,740 2.93
Per Capita GDP (P)
at current prices . 19,656 20,789 22,013 24,685 27,114 8.41
at constant 1985 prices 11,285 11,058 10,961 11,171 11,438 0.35
PopuIation (million persons)* 63.49 65.01 66.98 68.62 70.27 2.57 Z
Inflation rate 18.7 8.9 7.6 9.8 8.1 -13.85 r_
Exchange rate (US$1.00=Peso) 27.48 25.51 26.99 26.45 25.70 -1.55
Population projection based on 1990 Census of Population and Housing. C)
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board.
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cent reforms created a more competitive financial market, stimu-
lating the increase in the number of banking establishments and
the introduction of many innovative financial products) Gross
real savings of the country over the last five years have been in-
creasing at an average rate of 5.8 percent per annum (Table II-2).
A significant increase in real savings was noted after 1993 as the
economy started to recover from stagnation in 1990-91. The in-
crease, however, was mainly attributable to the growth in savings
of government and corporations. The savings of households and
unincorporated enterprises were at a high level in 1991 but slowly
declined in the following years. The savings to national output
ratio over the last five years averaged at about 20 percent.
Deposits and lending rates appear to have stabilized starting
in 1993 (Table II-3). Nominal savings rates, while significantly
higher in recent years (averaging 8 percent) than in 1991 (close
to 5 percent), are still not very different from inflation rates;
thus, negative or near zero real savings rates have persisted.
Real time deposit rates have also been low, particularly in the
last two years, averaging only at about 1 percent per annum.
On the other hand, lending rates have been decreasing (Table
I1-3). Weighted average interest rates on loans granted by com-
mercial banks averaged at 15 percent per annum in the last
three years compared to 23 percent and 19 percent in 1991 and
1992, respectively.
3. Access of the Poor to FinanciaI Services
Banks rarely lend, if at all, to the poor, mostly because of
information problems, the lack of acceptable collateral, and the
high transaction costs of processing small loans. Formal credi-
tors view lending to the poor in agriculture as a high risk be-
cause of the risks associated with agricultural production? Fur-
3. For example, there is now a growing home mortgage market to meet the
demand for middle class housing.
4. Various studies of the Agricultural Credit Policy Council have confirmed
this. A recent survey of four of the poorest provinces in the country also made this
observation. (See Llanto 1994.)TABLE II-2 to
Savings Trends, 1991-1995
% Annual
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Growth
GNP Growth Rate (%) 0.08 1.42 1.33 5.28 5.73
Nominal Savings (PM) 241,336 264,200 271,167 368,076 402,625 14.31
Real Savings (PM)
Households and Unincorporated
Enterprises 48,442 3,849 (2,854) (18,619) 12,753 29.42
Private/Government ,..
Corporations (1,899) 29,399 29,950 55,567 51,721 -391.91 O
General Government 30,141 37,493 29,136 38,962 36,216 7.19 _0
Depreciation 56,304 57,912 65,505 68,589 63,135 3.18 >Z
Gross Savings 138,094 140,264 135,001 166,599 169,882 5.80 Or"
Savings as % of GNP
Households and Unincorporated
Enterp rises 6.71 0.53 (0.38) (2.37) 1.53
Private/Government
Corporations (0.26) 4.03 4.01 7.07 6.22
General Government 4.17 5.14 3.90 4.95 4.36
Depreciation 7.79 7.94 8.77 8.72 7.59 t-_
Gross Savings 19.12 19.22 18.07 21.19 20.43 O






Selected Interest Rates, 1991-1995
O
% Annual Z
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Growth Item
f)
r_
Savings Deposits 4.7 10.6 8.0 8.3 8.2p 26.0
Time Deposits (All maturities) 18.5 14.1 10.8 10.4 8.9p -16.3
Secured Loans (All maturities) 22.7 19.4 15.0 14.7 14.7 -9.8 C
Treasury Bills (91 days) 21.4 16.1 13.6 12.3 11.8p -13.5
Interbank Call Loan Rate (IBCL) 15.7 16.7 13.4 13.6 -4.1
Sources: 1993 Philippine Development Report and B_agko Senfa'alng Pilipmas.14 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
thermore, banks and other nonbank financial intermediaries are
mostly concentrated in Metro Manila and other urban areas,
leaving many of the regions without adequate banking facilities.
The latest NEDA survey shows that less than 12 percent of
low-income rural families had borrowed since 1991 (Herrin and
Racelis 1992). Of those who borrowed, nearly two-fifths sourced
their loans from relatives and friends while another one-third
borrowed from private moneylenders and cooperatives. Only a
small percentage relied on government and private banks for
loans. The bulk of the low-income families who did not borrow
from formal sources cited burdensome bank requirements, high
interest rate and lack of collateral as well as ignorance of pos-
sible credit sources as major reasons for not borrowing. In gen-
eral, it can be said that the poor's lack of access to formal finan-
cial services may be partly explained by the very structure of the
financial system which is biased against the poor.
The government's response was to create a number of credit
programs intended to provide the poor with access to financial
services. The National Credit Council reports as many as 111
credit programs of which 13 are targeted to the ultra-poor. One
nationwide program designed specifically for working women
in the informal sector is the Women Workers Employment and
Entrepreneurship Development (WEED) program of the Bureau
of Women and Young Workers of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). The program is envisioned to address the
need Of women for jobs either as employees or entrepreneurs. To
achieve this objective, the program provides them with liveli-
hood activities and harnesses their entrepreneurial abilities.
Project beneficiaries are qualified women worker groups who
will undergo social preparation, entrepreneurship and other ap-
propriate training and, eventually, receive credit assistance for
their entrepreneurial/income generating endeavors. Women
group beneficiaries can borrow up to P200,000 with a maturity
of two years at 6 percent interest rate per annum.
Another program that encourages lending to poor women is
the Micro Credit Program for the Bottom Poor jointly imple-
mented by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC) of theLLANTOetal.:MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 15
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Land Bank of the Phil-
ippines (LBP). This program provides loans to qualified nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), cooperatives or cooperative
banks (CRBs) which are to relend in turn to the bottom poor for
their micro-credit livelihood projects. LBP provides a lending
window for accredited NGOs/cooperatives/CRBs which can ob-
tain a maximum credit line of P5 million. The loans shall be used
solely for relending to groups or individually managed micro
livelihood projects of households/individuals who belong to the
bottom 30 percent income bracket. In addition, the participating
NGOs/cooperatives/CRBs can avail themselves of a grant assis-
tance to cover operating expenses related to social preparation,
training and related activities intended for the institutional de-
velopment of the beneficiaries. The program, launched in 1996,
covers the poor priority provinces identified by the Presidential
Commission on Countryside Development and the Presidential
Commission to Fight Poverty (PCFP).
4. Public Policy and Microfinance Programs on
Poverty Alleviation S
The seriousness of the poverty situation cannot be overem-
phasized. In formulating its strategies to address poverty, the
Philippine government recognizes that: (1) the nature and inten-
sity of the needs of the different poor groups are diverse, as are
the causes of their problems; hence, solutions for them vary; (2)
appropriate macroeconomic and sectoral policies induce vigor-
ous and sustained economic growth which will have a powerful
impact on reducing poverty, although not all poor people will
benefit as much because they do not have the means to do so;
and (3) the responses of different poor groups to government
interventions targeted at poverty alleviation differ.
5. Drawn from the document "A National Strategy to Fight Poverty" pre-
pared for the Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty by the Philippine Institute for
Development Studies, 1995.16 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
The government believes that direct intervention in the form
of intensified delivery of basic services will be necessary to im-
prove the lot of the subsistence poor. In addition, community
organization will be indispensable in building capabilities, to-
gether with livelihood projects which can provide diverse sources
of income to poor communities.
The Ramos administration, through the Presidential Com-
mission to Fight Poverty (PCFP), 6 has identified five major strat-
egies to address the problem of poverty.
1. Promote and sustain economic grozoth to create employment
and livelihood opportunities. At the macroeconomic level, the goal
is to attain and sustain rapid economic growth at 5 to 7 percent
annually in order to reduce the number of families living below
the income poverty line from 39.2 percent in 1991 to 30 percent
by 1998. Thus, the government will undertake the following: (a)
embark on a massive infrastructure program directed primarily
at the rural areas and in areas with the greatest capacity to
provide jobs; (b) improve revenue collection; (c) encourage in-
vestments by reducing interest rates to borrowers, and raise the
interest rate on savings by reducing the government budget defi-
cit, issuing small-denomination government notes for small sav-
ers, and removing unnecessary impositions on financial transac-
tions; (d) emphasize voluntary arbitration on the resolution of
industrial disputes; (e) continue reforms that will compel the
large monopolized and protected sectors of the economy to be-
come more competitive globally and reduce the biases against
small and medium enterprises through tariff restructuring, lib-
eral foreign investment rules and the passage of antitrust laws;
and (f) ensure adequate national and local government funding
for specific sectors such as education, health and housing.
2. Sustain growth based on people-friendly strategies. Economic
activities must be made accessible to those who are poor while at
the same time being efficient and productive enough to yield bet-
6. PCFP was subsequently replaced by the National Anti-Poverty Commis-
sion in 1997 through an act of Congress.LLANTOetal,: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 17
ter incomes. The following activities will be needed: (a) promotion
of new labor-intensive industries with higher domestic value
added, better export potential, and stronger links with agricul-
ture, for example, food processing; (b) pursuance of policies that
are consistent with efficiency, improve prices for agricultural prod-
ucts, lower prices for agricultural inputs, and promote diversifi-
cation into products that have higher value, use more labor and
make more efficient use of land; (c) active use of an exchange rate
policy to promote agriculture and export-oriented industries while
at the same time generating financing for safety nets to stem infla-
tion and a wage-price spiral; (d) conservation and management
of natural resources by entrusting these to their immediate com-
munities, formulating and implementing policies on resource use
and imposing higher taxes on the use of natural resources and on
pollution; (e) protection of the gains under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program while reassessing the pace of its future
implementation; (f) revival of rural financing by wholesale lend-
ing to cooperatives and legitimization of NGOs, which should then
retail the credit to farmers, marginal borrowers and people's or-
ganizations at market rates; consolidation of all resources currently
used in the government's livelihood programs that are not focused
on the core poor into a credit facility for the poor; strengthening
and full development of cooperatives and NGOs as efficient retail
credit institutions; keeping of commercial interest rates at low lev-
els; and (g) devotion of more funds to agricultural research and
extension, with continuing training for devolved extension per-
sonnel.
3. Expand social services to provide minimum basic needs. Mini-
mum basic needs of the poor such as primary health care and
family planning, elementary education, supplemental feeding,
housing, water and sanitation will be addressed.
4. Foster sustainable income-generating community projects.
Greater emphasis on livelihood projects with components in-
cluding skills and technology training, credit and livelihood as-
sistance, and technical extension is required. The following must
be accomplished: (a) consolidation of lending programs for the18 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
core poor, or those which include a subsidy element (i.e., those
charging submarket interest rates) under the PCFP, and designa-
tion of such programs exclusively for the use of the poorest of
the poor; (b) design of credit schemes according to the capabili-
ties of poor groups; in general, credit should be extended at
commercial rates exclusively and without collateral to the poor;
(c) coordination of efforts in providing training for the poor in
livelihood and income-generating projects, particularly by im-
proving the quality and relevance of the training provided, as
well as the quality of training facilities; (d) dissemination of
information on available livelihood services, and decentraliza-
tion or expansion of the reach of existing training programs.
5. Build capabilities of the poor to help themselves. The most
important element in a strategy to fight poverty is not what it
can provide or do for the poor but whether that strategy ulti-
mately enables the poor to do something for themselves. The
process of building capabilities among the poor may be done in
the following ways: (a) rely on local governments as the main
implementors of antipoverty projects in the critical municipal
and barangay levels, so that local leaders may become directly
accountable to the poor communities that are supposed to ben-
efit from them; (b) mobilize NGOs and people's organizations
(POs) as equal partners in planning priorities and selecting
•projects; (c) promote the formation of POs in poor communities
to articulate their needs, design self-help programs, mobilize their
own resources as well as outside resources, implement projects,
and monitor and evaluate their own progress; and (d) keep
track of the overall progress of poverty alleviation through a
community-managed monitoring system in each barangay ad-
ministered through local government units.
5. Regulatory Framework for Financial Institutions
The Philippine financial system is divided into a formal sector
under the regulation and supervision of the BSP, the Insurance
Commission and the Cooperative Development Authority, and
an informal sector which is neither supervised nor regulated by
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consists of a wide array of banking and nonbanking institutions
performing various financial intermediation services. Following
the financial reforms instituted over the past decade and a half,
these financial institutions have engaged in a nuniber of activities
and have offered various financial products targeted to specific
clientele in the formal financial markets. They have also ex-
panded rapidly. In terms of resources, the formal financial system
has been experiencing double-digit annual growth since 1987. 7
All these institutions are under BSP supervision and/or regu-
lation, with the exception of insurance companies which are
supervised by the Insurance Commission, and the credit unions/
credit cooperatives which are under the Cooperative Develop-
ment Authority. However, the regulation of NBFIs is less strict
compared to that of banks, one reason being that the latter are
in the strict sense fiduciary institutions.
The Central Bank of the Philippines (later renamed Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas) started a series of financial reforms for more
efficient financial markets in the 1980s, and this continued into
the 1990s. The reforms improved the financial policy environ-
ment and strengthened the supervisory and regulatory frame-
work of financial institutions. Interest rate ceilings were removed;
the Central Bank's subsidized rediscount window was made
market-oriented; interest rates on special subsidized credit pro-
grams were aligned with market rates; bank entry and branch-
ing policy was liberalized and the areas of allowable equity
investments of universal banks were expanded. In 1993, a new
and strengthened institution, the BSP, replaced the Central Bank
of the Philippines. More recently, the government liberalized the
entry of foreign banks into the domestic financial market, allow-
ing 10 foreign banks to set up shop in the country. The aim is to
intensify competition in the domestic financial market3
7. A good reference is Lamberte and Llanto (1995).
8. Alongside this formal system exists an informal credit market which caters
to the credit needs of low income groups, small and micro enterprises, small farmers
and fisherfolk, and other marginal borrowers who were unable to access the formal
financial market_ See Llanto and Chua (1996), Chua and Llanto (1995), among oth-
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The financial sector reforms have created a more competitive
financial marketplace, driving financial institutions, regardless
of bank type, to compete with each other. Banks compete in
deposit taking by offering a wide range of deposit instruments
with diverse features and varied rates of interest. The innovative
deposit products target different income groups. With extensive
branch networks and automated teller machines, commercial
banks have been able to mobilize nearly 80 percent of total
deposits in the banking industry. On the other hand, credit unions
and cooperatives offer members deposit instruments in the form
of fixed deposits which earn interest but cannot be withdrawn
until membership ends. They also offer savings and time depos-
its which pay interest and are withdrawable. Cooperatives and
credit unions are outside the Bangko Sentral's regulation and
supervision, but they are supervised by the Cooperative Devel-
opment Authority (CDA). These institutions have no minimum
capital requirement, no reserve requirement on deposits and are
exempted from taxes imposed on financial institutions. Their
recent performance shows a remarkable ability to mobilize de-
posits from small savers? The NGOs, which are considered in-
formal credit institutions, are not allowed to mobilize deposits.
The strict financial and credit policy framework of banking
institutions in the early 1970s encouraged the establishment and
growth of nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFIs). These insti-
tutions became subject to Central Bank control under the 1972
financial reforms. In general, the NBFIs are not allowed to bor-
row from the public. Some are subject to minimum capital and
reserve requirements as well as loan ceilings and borrowers'
limits. The NBFIs do not engage in deposit-taking activities but
rely on their own capital for funds. Nonbank thrift institutions,
pawnshops and investment companies follow the same practice.
In contrast, NBFIs with quasi-banking functions source a large
part of their funds from borrowing.
9. See Llanto (1994) for a more extensive discussion of Philippine credit unions/
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Banks have, on the average, four branches while more than
three-fifths of the NBFIs do not have branches. Some NBFIs are
allowed to establish only one branch. In terms of regional distri-
bution, more than one-third of the total number of offices of
NBFIs are concentrated in the National Capital Region. Other
regions are mostly served by lending investors, pawnshops and,
to a smaller extent, finance companies.
Cognizant of the need to provide access to credit to the basic
sectors of the economy, e.g., small-scale agriculture, small enter-
prises, etc., the government put in place several pohcies on credit
allocation and deposit retention. These are the following:
(a) requiring 75 percent of the deposits generated from a
regional grouping to be invested in that area;
(b) mandating banks to set aside 25 percent of their net in-
cremental loanable funds for agricultural lending, 10 per-
cent of which is to be lent to agrarian reform beneficia-
ries and 15 percent for general agricultural lending
(agri-agra loan quota);
(c) mandating all lending institutions to lend at least 10 per-
cent of their total loan portfolio to small enterprises whose
total assets amount to P10 million and below;
(d) liberalizing bank branching regulations; and
(e) implementing various directed credit programs for the
basic sectors.
In addition, the government has increasingly used NGOs as
alternative credit conduits, instead of coursing credit funds solely
through banks. Thus, credit programs such as the DTI
Microcredit Project, the ACPC's Grameen Replication Project
and the NLSF's loan program have used .the NGOs as credit
conduits.LLANTOetal.:MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 23
III. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND
CONSTRAINTS
This study uses a purposive sample of seven microfinance
institutions (MFIs) composed of five credit NGOs, two of which
are waiting for their banking license from the BSP, and one
cooperative rural bank which has successfully used the Grameen
technology in reaching the poor. This section used case studies
of these MFIs for the analysis of the performance, issues and
constraints faced by MFIs. Information on the legal identity, or-
ganizational history, objectives, etc., of individual sample MFIs
can be found in their respective case studies. We organized the
analysis into four subtopics, namely: (1) outreach to the poor; (2)
viability and sustainability; (3) resource mobilization; and (4) policy
environment.
1. Outreach to the Poor
Outreach to the poor depends on a variety of factors, namely:
(1) effective targeting and exclusivity of focus; (2) institutional
capacity; (3) range of financial services provided; (4) technical
assistance for poor clients; and (5) regular or periodic impact
evaluation of credit programs for the poor.
1. Targeting and exclusivity. Not all the sample MFIs target
exclusively the poor although most of those that use the Grameen
Bank technology do have an exclusive focus, especially on poor
women. Some do not exclusively target poor women. On the
other hand, a few credit NGOs implement credit programs tar-
geted to both poor and nonpoor borrowers. A common reason
given is that the profits from loans to the nonpoor are used to
subsidize the (losing) less profitable credit program for the poor.
For the sample bank, the credit program for the poor is just one
of many other product offerings of the bank. The MFIs identify
the poor through a means testing, an examination of their asset
ownership, and a housing index which reveals the income or
wealth status of the prospective client. The means testing and
use of house index are mostly done by the Grameen replicators.
Interviews and home visits complement the means testing. They24 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
also conduct a general assessment of the clients' incomes and
ownership of simple assets such as farming implements, farm
animals, home furniture, as well as of the types of houses, build-
ing materials used in house construction, access to or availability
of water and sanitation, and educational attainment of the house-
hold head and family members.
The sample MFIs conduct the following: (a) area scanning to
identify the area with a large percentage of families living below
the poverty line; (b) orientation screening to introduce the credit
program, orient and train the groups on the value of discipline
and team responsibility; and (c) individual background investi-
gation to effectively target clientele. Tables III-I and III-2 show
the sample MFIs' outreach to poor borrowers and savers, re-
spectively.
In sum, the poor borrowers and savers predominate, indicating
an almost exclusive focus on the poor. This shows the effectiveness of
the targeting mechanism used by the MFls in identifying poor cli-
ents. 1° The credit NGOs and the private bank replicating the Grameen
technology use an effective means to identify and reach the poor.
However, their outreach is still limited to a few thousandpoor bor-
rowers. 11 The credit NGO community, composed of about 500 indi-
vidual institutions, estimates their outreach to cover some 30,000
borrowers.12
2. Institutional capacitlj. The 1992 NEDA Socioeconomic Sur-
vey showed that only about 12 percent of ultra-poor families
had access to credit. Some 38 percent of credit came from friends
and relatives, 18 percent from private moneylenders, and 13
percent from cooperatives. Only very few of the poor were able
to get a loan from government specialized banks and private
10. It could also be that, by the very nature of these MFls, the poor would
naturally be drawn to them as potential clients-a case of self-selection.
11. Even the largest credit NGO in the country which has been in operation for
the past 10 years had only 3,119 borrowers and 3,024 savers as of-end 1995.
12. A Strategy to Fight Poverty: Philippines, The World Bank, March 1996.LLANTO et al.: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 25
TABLE III-1
MFl's Outreach to Poor Borrowers
Female Male
MFI TOTAL
Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor
A 1,695 - - - 1,695
B 5,866 - - - 5,866
C 3,980 - 69 - 4,049
D 1,307 10 231 4 1,552
E 1,330 279 - 183 1, 792
F 1,993 - 1,126 - 3,119
G 764 106 256 75 1,196
TOTAL 16,935 395 1,677 262 19,269
TABLE III-2
MFl's Outreach to Poor Savers
MFI Female Male TOTAL
Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor
A 1,695 .... 1,695
B 6,952 - - - 6,952
C 3,980 - 69 - 4,049
D 1,160 10 203 4 1,377
E 1,415 672 - 496 2,583
F 1,941 - 1,083 - 3,024
G 1,058 - 201 - 1,259
TOTAL 18,201 682 1,556 500 20,939
banks. 13The NGOs provided only 2.9 percent of credit in urban
areas and 1.9 percent in rural areas. On the other hand, (pri-
vate) cooperative rural banks seem to have reached a greater
number of poor clients compared to other MFIs. In 1993 they
reported that about 37,000 mostly individual loans with an av-
13. A more recent set of estimates noted that the "basic sectors" composed of
rural residents and farmers, operators of small enterprises and the self-employed and
the ultra poor had great difficulty in accessing the formal financial system (Adams et
al. 1995). More specifically, it is estimated that only 168,000 out of 581,000 munici*
pal fishing operators and 80,000 out of 317,490 small nonagricultural establishments
had access to the formal credit system.26 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
erage size of P22,000 were given. Some loans were as small as
P1,000. TMThe experience of the Cooperative Rural Bank (CRB) of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, showed the capacity of the cooperative rural
bank to provide microfinancial services to the poor. This same
experience was reported by the Cooperative Rural Bank of Aklan,
the Davao Cooperative Bank and several MFIs, and most rural
banks and cooperative rural banks in Mindanao which accept
small deposits (as low as P100) and provide loans as small as
P1,000. 's Table III-3 shows more recent estimates of MFIs' out-
reach. The credit cooperatives and the cooperative rural banks
have a greater reach than the NGOs and people's organizations,
and this may be partly explained by their more extensive deliv-
ery network and relatively larger financial base. '6
Among private lending institutions, pawnshops, credit unions
and lending investors also provide credit to small enterprises
and individuals but their lending is collateral-based. Pawnshops
require the pledging of certain assets such as jewelry, wrist
watches, appliances, etc., while lending investors can require
pledging of motor vehicles and other important assets. In the
case of credit unions, the fixed deposits serve as collateral (Llanto
1994 and Chua and Llanto 1995).
Any discussion of the outreach of microfinance programs
should include those of the government's various livelihood/credit
programs targeted to the poor. The government has 111 subsi-
dized credit programs of which 13 are targeted to the ultra-poor
(Table III-4). These are implemented through various government
agencies and specialized government banks. For example, the De-
partment of Trade and Industry uses the NGOs, cooperatives, and
rural banks as credit conduits of funds sourced from the Asian
Development Bank and from budgetary allocation. As of March
14. WorldBank,ibid.
15. Theseniorauthorwas a memberofa teamofconsultantswho conducteda
surveyof40MFlsin Mindanao, Philippines, in 1996.Theinformationon theCoopera-
tive RuralBankof Aklanwas suppliedby M.Agabinof theSocialWeatherStations
and a researcherfromACPC.
16. Therearemorethan1,000ruralbanksand42 cooperativerural bankshathe
country.Creditcooperativesare muchmorenumerousthanthesebanks.LLANTO et al.: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 27
TABLE III-3
Estimate of Institutional Reach in Micro Finance
Estimated Average Average Estimated
Institutions Number Loan Reach Total
Size Reach
1. Development NGOs 150 4,000 150 22,500
2. Grameen Replicators 40 2,000 500 20,000
3. Credit NGOs/Mature 30 5,000 1,000 30,000
4. Credit NGOs/Beginning 100 4,500 250 25,000
5. Coop Rural Banks 42 21,700 2,000 84,000
6. Credit Cooperatives 1,500 10,000 300 450,000
7. People's Organizations 500 3 500 50 25,000
TOTAL 2,762 _ _ 656,500
Source: R. Chua and G. Llanto (1995).
TABLE III-4
Government Livelihood Programs, Philippines, 1995
Borrowers Targeted
Salaried Small &
Agri-Credit Ultra-Poor & Self- Medium TOTAL
Employed
No. of Programs 39 13 21 38 111
No. of Implementing
Agencies 19 4 12 9
Estimated Funds >Pll.06 No data >P3.2 >P16.7 >P30.9
Available billion available billion billion billion
Interest Rate 6-14% 0%; 6% to 3-18% 7-24%
(per annum) market rate
Source: National Credit Council.
1996, the NGO Microcredit Project of the Department of Trade
and Industry Tulong sa Tao Program had released about P1.2 bil-
lion in loans to 82,157 borrowers through 1,944 conduits.
Another government line department, the Social Welfare and
Development Department, provides the poor with small loans
ranging from P1,000 to P3,000 through the Self-employment As-28 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
sistance Program. Under this program, the DSWD has directly
lent some P164 million to 45,250 clients. The Agricultural Credit
Pohcy Council has a Grameen Bank Replication Project involving
23 NGOs, cooperatives and cooperative rural banks as replicators.
As of December 1994, the replication project had enabled 13,432
borrowers to avail themselves of loans amounting to P31 million.
The Land Bank of the Philippines, a specialized government
bank, has been the main source of funding for agrarian reform
beneficiaries and small farmers, using rural banks and about 8,000
cooperatives as credit intermediaries. Recently, it organized the
People's Credit and Finance Corporation (PCFC), a government
finance company which will be its principal arm in lending to the
poor. The objective is to use PCFC for poverty alleviation lending
programs so that Land Bank may concentrate on its mandate to
be the financing arm of agrarian reform and to service the agri-
culture sector's growing demand for various financial services.
Prior to the creation of PCFC, the government used the National
Livelihood Support Fund (NLSF) under the Office of the Presi-
dent to provide microfinance loans. In 1995, the NLSF made avail-
able P83 million in credit lines to about 60 MFIs. The maximum
loan amount per borrower is P25,000. As of March 1996, the NLSF
had lent about P46 million to 28 rural banks and 10 cooperative
rural banks which in turn provided loans to 4,345 clients.
Despite all these attempts by the government, the private
sector cooperatives and banks and the credit NGOs, the overall
outreach to poor borrowers has been very hmited. On the gov-
ernment side, only five agencies, namely, the Departments of
Social Welfare and Development, Agriculture, Agrarian Reform,
Trade and Industry and the National Livelihood Support Fund 17
have programs that can potentially reach a larger number of the
poor. However, Philippine experience has shown the gross inef-
ficiency and high costs of using government nonfinancial insti-
tutions to implement credit programs. Recent research has shown
the unsustainability of government supply-led credit programs,
17. At present, the PCFC is the main arm of the government in lending to the poor.LLANTOetal.:MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 29
the likelihood of leakage of the benefits of government credit
programs to the nonpoor, the duplication and overlapping of a
number of credit programs leading to gross inefficiencies, the
distortion of the financial market, and the weakening of private
sector incentive to innovate. 18
On the part of the private sector, the private banks, except for
some rural banks and cooperative rural banks, have not serviced
the financial requirements of the poor because of the high trans-
action cost, the lack of information to and understanding by the
poor, and the absence of a financial delivery mechanism suitable
for delivering financial services to the poor. Even with the legal
mandate under the agriculture-agrarian loan quota, the Magna
Carta for Small Enterprises and the various loan guarantees of-
fered by the government, the private banks' response to the poor's
demand for financial services has been limited to making avail-
able wholesale loan funds which will be retailed by NGOs, or to
purchasing government securities as a way of alternatively com-
plying with the agriculture-agrarian loan quota.
The Bankers' Association of the Philippines (BAP) organized
the BAP Credit Guaranty Corporation (BCGC) as its conduit for
lending to the basic sectors. According to the BCGC, only seven
NGOs have availed themselves of loans from a credit line amount-
ing to P17.5 million which was opened by the corporation to MFIs.
The Bank of the Philippine Islands Foundation has also provided
loans to accredited NGOs and cooperatives which will retail loans
to the poor. More recently, a commercial bank has given loans to a
credit NGO to augment the latter's loanable funds to the poor.
Thus, the MFIs use a variety of funds, namely: (a) donor funds; (b)
concessional loans from the government agencies and specialized
government banks; and (c) credit lines from the private banking
sector for their lending operations to the poor.
The credit NGOs are the only institutions with an almost
exclusive focus on the poor. However, they are hampered by
18. Thishasbeendocumented in various research ontheimplementation ofagri-
culturalcreditprograms.See,forexample,NeriandLlanto(1985), Lamberteand Lira
(1986),Esguerra(1981),Llanto(1993),amongothers.30 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
their weak institutional capacity. In interviews conducted by
these authors, the inadequate institutional capacity of MFIs, es-
pecially the credit NGOs, in handling microfinance emerged as
the principal reason for the slow availment of the credit lines.
The nonformal character of their organization partly explains
this weakness. Without a legal personality as full-fledged finan-
cial institutions, credit NGOs can neither raise sufficient equity
nor tap deposits to sustain their operations. Lending funds are
available from many sources, (e.g., BCGC, NLSF and other gov-
ernment agencies and financial institutions) but the weak ab-
sorptive capacity of MFIs such as the credit NGOs appears as a
binding constraint to a greater outreach to the poor.
What compounds the problem is the absence of an extensive
and viable network for delivering financial services to the poor.
The nationwide branch network of various types of private banks,
including unit banks such as rural banks, is a potential medium
for banking with the poor. The main drawback lies in the appar-
ent reluctance of the private banking network to deal with this
type of clientele. The rural banks and cooperative rural banks
have a great potential. In fact, some of them such as those in
Mindanao are already into microfinance programs. Perhaps, as
more information on the profitability of banking with the poor is
made available to them, and as more of the experience with
banking with the poor is shared with private .financial institu-
tions, the rural banking system will in time pick up the challenge.
Table III-5 presents the Philippine NGO situation. More than
30,000 NGOs have enlisted with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, of which 7,000 are categorized as "development
NGOs." Of the lot, some 500 are the so-called "credit NGOs," of
which less than 50 employ commercial lending and partly cover
,their costs. On the other hand, the rural banks and cooperative
rural banks have a nationwide, viable delivery network. 19How-
19. The rural banking system was weakened by [he high default rates and
nonrepayment of loans under the government's subsidized agricultural credit pro-
grams during the 1970s and 1980s. The BSP had to implement several rehabilitation







<50 NGOs doing commercial approach to lending and
covering part of their costs
B. Reach
* average of 100-200 borrowers per NGO
* 2%of credit needs of poor borrowers
Source: CODE-NGO, NEDA Monitoring Study, TSPIestimate.
ever, little is known yet about their actual outreach to the poor
through microfinancial services, except the information gath-
ered through several quick field appraisals. For example, rural
banks and cooperative rural banks in Mindanao do provide
microfinancial services. In 1995, the number of loan accounts
per rural bank and cooperative rural bank averaged 2,000 while
the number of deposit accounts averaged 6,000, implying a
loans-to-deposit accounts ratio of 3.20However, despite the more
extensive network of rural banks and cooperative rural banks,
they do not have the same familiarity with and substantial ex-
posure to the poor as do the credit NGOs. The irony is that those
institutions with almost exclusive focus on the poor do not have
the institutional capacity to reach a greater number of the poor.
The MFIs provide their field staff with basic training in the
identification of the target clientele, appraisal of projects submit-
ted for financing, and credit investigation of the loan applicant.
The existing lending technology for the poor (e.g., Grameen,
group lending and various adaptations of these approaches) is
labor-intensive, requiring great patience, dedication and techni-
cal skills on the part of field staff. Field staff are carefully se-
20- The comparable ratio is six depositors to one borrower in Bank Rakyat
Indonesia's Unit Desa,and a 1:1ratio in Grameen Bank (seeRobinson 1994).32 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
lected based on their high motivation in helping the poor, educa-
tional background and willingness to work with the poor.
Some MFIs report problems of high turnover of staff because
of the relatively low salaries that they can offer. Once trained and
experienced, those field staff become eligible for related jobs in
the government agencies involved in livelihood programs, and in
the private banking sector, more specifically, rural banks and co-
operative rural banks. The high turnover of field staff and the
difficulty of retaining present staff prevent the buildup of capac-
ity to provide efficient and effective microfinance services to the
poor.
In sum, both the weak institutional capacity and the lack of an ex-
tensive and viable delivery system prevent MFls, especially credit
NGOs, from reaching a greater number of clients. The principal prob-
lem faced by credit NGOs is the lack of legal personality and authority
to act as realfinancial intermediaries. The second problem is the lack of
an extensive and viable financial delivery system that has substantial
focus on the poor. Motivation of MFIs" staff to work with poor clients is
not wanting but the MFIs face problems of rapid staff turnover.
3. Range of financial services provided. Most MFIs provide
simple loans and savings facilities for poor clientele. This is con-
sistent with the nature of the demand of the poor for financial
services. As of 1995, the sample MFIs had provided total loans
amounting to P128.7 million, the bulk of which went to poor
clients (Table III-6). It is to be noted that not all of the sample
MFIs have the poor as their exclusive clientele, except those
practicing the Grameen technology. 2_The MFIs also provide "sav-
ings" facilities, z2As of 1995, total savings amounted to as much
21. The cooperative rural bank, which also uses the Grameen technology, pro-
vides loans both to poor and nonpoor clients,
22. Technically, the credit NGOs are not authorized to accept deposits. The
"savings" deposits mentioned here refer to the obligatory or forced savings deducted
from the loan amounts granted to borrowers. Also, the groups mobilize savings from
among the members and deposit them in a bank through the representation of the
NGO. The exception is the cooperative rural bank which is authorized to mobilize
voluntary savings.i.





Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor
A 3,476,006 - - - 3,476,006
B 8,003,607 .... 8,003,609
C 12,608,216 - 248,152 - 12,856,368
D 10,679,595 400,920 2,020,690 155,180 13,256,145
E 3,18,160 12,921,534 12,177,694 - 28,247,388
F 5,309,480 - 50,609,250 - 55,918,928
G 2,590,982 1,682,800 1,374,286 1,325,500 6,973,568
TOTAL 45,816,046 15,005,254 66,430,072 1,480,680 128,732,012
as 1-'17.6 million. It is to be noted that poor clients were able to
save a substantial amount as shown in Table IIi-7. Because the
credit NGOs are not authorized to mobilize deposits, several
innovative products have arisen. Some examples are the "mu-
tual aid fund," "the capital buildup," and the "group fund."
The mutual aid fund comes from the contribution of 5 percent
of the regular loan amount while the group fund is a pool of
weekly personal savings from each member of the group.
In general, we observe that most, if not all, of the loans carry
short-term maturities and are used primarily for working capital
and immediate consumption needs. The rural banks and coop-
erative rural banks try to offer competitive rates on deposits,
usually I to 2 percentage points above those offered by commer-
cial banks, while the credit NGOs offer innovative "savings"
products to mobilize savings from their clientele.
The immediate constraint is the inability of MFIs, especially
NGOs which are poorly capitalized, to offer more innovative
financial products with longer term maturities, and the lack of
information regarding the financial services/products that will
satisfy the target clientele. As the economy develops, there will
be an increased demand for more varied (and ultimately, sophis-
ticated) financial services and loans with longer maturities in
order to address certain investment needs such as the purchase
of more modern farm implements, basic equipments, etc. Thus,34 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
TABLE III-7
Amount of Savings Outstandingin Pesos
Female Male
MFI TOTAL
Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor
A 168,418 - - - 168,418
B 3,309,800 - - - 3,309,800
C 2,793,770 - 77,424 - 2,871,194
D 1,402,850 153,250 214,165 61,600 1,831,865
E 908,661 1,580,058 1,401,790 - 3,890,509
F 835,436 - 3,996,800 - 4,832,236
G 599,655 - 128,624 728,279
TOTAL 10,018,590 1,733,308 5,818,803 61,600 17,632,302
the MFIs must strive to improve their limited capacity to supply
innovative financial products. The estimated amount of total
financial services as of 1995 provided by the sample MFIs is
shown in Table III-8. The average loans outstanding and the
average savings mobilized are shown in Tables III-9 and III-10.
This indicates the potential of the sample MFIs to provide a full
range of financial products and services once the limitation of
the NGO organizational structure has been overcome.
In sum, the limited capacihy to develop and offer legally innova-
tive financial products hampers the cause of credit NGOs. This limi-
tation arises from their limited experience or lack of familiarihy and
experience in product development and innovation. More importantly,
the informalihy of their organization makes any attempt to mobilize
deposits, develop various financial products and offer them to the
public illegal.
4. Technical assistance for clients. On the part of the target
clientele, training consists of orientation in the value and use of
credit, the need to have credit discipline, group cooperation and
organization, and the handling of the savings fund of group
members. Table IIM1 shows the range of technical assistance
provided to beneficiaries. The use of peer pressure and the threat
of cutting access to future credit in case of loan default are





Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor
A 3,644,422 ....
B 11,313,407 ....
C 15,401,986 - 325,575 - 15,727,561
D 12,082,445 554,170 2,234,855 217,480 15,088,01.0
E 4,056,822 14,501,592 -- 13,579,484 32,137,898
F 6,144,916 - 54,606,050 - 60,750,966
G 3,190,637 1,682,800 1,502,910 1,325,500 7, 701,847
TABLE III-9
Average Loan Outstanding in Pesos, 1993
Female Male
MFI
Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor
A 2,05O - - -
B 1,364 - - -
C 3,168 - 3,596 -
D 8,171 40,092 8,748 38,970
E 2,367 46,314 - 66,545
F 774 (11,165) - 12,104 (42,258) -
G 3,514 12,005 5,475 13,107
TABLE III-10
Average Savings Mobilized in Pesos, 1995
Female Male
MFI
Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor
A 99 - - -
B 476 - - -
C 702 - 1,122 -
D 1,209 15,325 1,005 15,400
E 642 - - 2,826
F 261 (7,909) - 3,659 (8,571) -
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sure high loan repayment rates. The problem is not the lack of
interest on the part of the poor clientele to train and acquire
various skills related to credit and savings, but the cost of train-
ing incurred by the MFI.
Training or social preparation as termed by the NGOs is a
significant component of the transaction cost of lending to the
poor. A case study of two NGOs estimated a social preparation
cost of as much as P0.11 for each peso loan granted (Llanto and
Chua 1996). The case studies of MFIs for this country paper also
confirm this observation. An estimate of the unit cost of various
training programs is shown in Table III-11. At present, social
preparation or training is conducted mostly at the own initiative
of the MFIs. Except for some insignificant financial assistance
coming from government agencies, 23the MFIs have to rely either
on their own meager funds or external donors to cover the costs
of training.
The current issue is who will finance the training of clients,
i.e., social preparation. One view is that this is a public good
whose production must be shouldered by the government. This
view states that subsidies for training must be made available to
MFIs which implement microfinance programs for the poor. The
contrary view states that the cost of training should be incorpo-
rated in the lending rate charged by the MFI or absorbed by the
MFI itself as part of the cost of doing business. This is practiced
by one of the sample MFIs which charges a training and moni-
toring fee of 2 percent of the loan amount.
It seems that there is some capacity to transfer the burden of
the training costs to the clients themselves who have no alterna-
tive but to absorb them. However, this view might lead to un-
derproduction of social training because the MFIs may not want
to increase the cost of lending to poor clients; they may not
want either to absorb the cost of social training. This could lead
to a suboptimal level of social preparation/training. The benefits
23. The ACPC provided the Graraeen replicator$ with a grant covering the ini-
tim year's salary and training expenses of field staff who will handle the replication.LLANTO et al.: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 37
TABLE III-11
Technical Assistance Provided to Beneficiaries
Technical Average
Assistance/ Delivery Cost Per
Education Objective Method Participant
Service (Is)
Program sell program; provide sav- Field exposure 52.32
Orientation ings and loan guidelines; seminar
familiarize with member
responsibilities
Gender Unburdening of gender included in 0.00
Sensitivity concerns; understanding meetings
Issues regular gender issues;
Ecological resource conservation and field exposure 0.00
Awareness optimizaton creativity in
resource mobilization
Marriage marriage values included in 0.00
Enrichment God-centered in life regular
Seminar meetings
Value self-enhancement; values seminar 74.49
Formation clarification; discipline;
Seminar group-building
Leadership facilitation skills; commu- seminar; field 126.36
Training nication & documentation exposure
skills
Livelihood specific skills enhancement seminar/field 44.63
Skills Training exposure
Simple Business learn simple accounting seminar 88.40
Management planning/and budgeting
Simple Book- learn bookkeeping seminar 204_32
keeping
Financial and sound business seminar 268.18
Business accounting & management
Management
Organization facilitation skills; comm- included in 0.00




Education Objective Delivery Participant
Service Method (Ps)
Training on instill guidelines on seminar 42.35
Loan and targeting and loans-for
Evaluation credit committees
Project planning and seminar 42.35
Management & strategizing of business; field exposure
Development expand creativity
of having "trained clients" will not be totally appropriated by
the MFI which initially trained them because clients shop around
for the lowest borrowing cost. It is also possible that over time
the "trained client" will need to go to another lender who can
satisfy his increased demand for credit because his old MFI can
no longer meet that demand. Thus, some amount of shirking of
the training responsibility may occur, leading to a social loss.
In sum, training of potential clients represents a sizable invest-
ment cost that the MFIs may not be able to absorb. While the govern-
ment and donors may be willing to provide funding for training, a
compromise solution lies in asking the MFIs to shoulder part of the
training costs. Thus, a matching of government funds with
MFI funds for training may lead to better performance because of the
risk-sharing involved.
5. Impact evaluation. The MFIs do not, in general, conduct
formal internal impact evaluations of their credit programs for
the poor because of the attendant costs. However, they do make
informal and quick evaluation of program implementation which
guides their decisions such as retraining of field staff, expansion
of coverage, etc. Neither are there independent and periodic
evaluations of these credit programs for the poor except for the
evaluation of the ADB NGO Microcredit Project (MCP) that
paved the way for the second NGO MCP, and of those done byLLANTO et al.: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 39
GTZ and JICA, respectively, on two of the sample MFIs. The
evaluation conducted by the ACPC itself on the progress of its
Grameen Replication Project is not an independent evaluation.
In sum, periodic impact evaluation is vend important because the
information generated will be useful in measuring the success of
microfinance programs, addressing various problems, improving the
project/program supervision, and designing future projects.
2. Viability, Sustainability and Resource Mobilization
1. Financial policies, delivery mechanism and management. The
MFIs' viability and sustainability are critically linked to their
financial policies, delivery mechanism and loan collection tech-
niques. With respect to financial policies, adherence to "sound
credit practices and response to market signals" (Sacay and
Randhawa 1995) is practiced by the sample MFIs. They lend at
market-based interest rates and are aware that they must at
least cover their operating costs. A nominal rate of 30 percent
per annum exclusive of a service charge (typically, 1 percent of
the loan amount) and application fee is common. 24The sample
MFIs employ sound credit screening and appraisal techniques
and provide noncollateralized loans to the poor. The
nonconventional loan security instruments used consist of joint
liability agreement, peer pressure and pledging of group sav-
ings. Thus, loan repayment rates are generally_ ktigh, usually on
the order of 95 percent.
The MFIs have used a variety of incentives to ensure loan
repayment and financial discipline. Forced savings have been
extracted from the borrowers which serve both as a pool of
funds to be used for emergency purposes and as collateral to the
loans extended by the MFIs. An interesting strategy for credit
discipline of one MFI is a 5 percent prompt payment guarantee
which is given back as rebate to clients who consistently pay
24. For example, one credit NGO charges a nominal rate of 30 percent per
annum or 3.5 percent per month and requires a service fee of 1 percent of the loan
amount--P10 for the (loan) record book and P10 application fee.40 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
their loan amortization on time, and a 2 percent surcharge for
loan balances after the past due date.
While the credit policies, loan screening, appraisal and col-
lection techniques appear sound, the sample MFIs have inad-
equate financial reporting and monitoring practices which make
it difficult to determine (a) past due loans; (b) which part of the
loan portfolio is nonperforming; and (c) the extent of the
arrearages problem. Without an adequate financial reporting
and monitoring system, the MFIs will find their liquidity se-
verely constrained and their capital impaired by nonperforming
loans. We failed to find any monitoring system that tracks loan
delinquencies and arrears and evaluates the aging of problem
loan accounts to give timely advice to management.
The lack of adequate and uniform performance standards is
evident among the MFIs. For example, the Grameen replicators
are urged to use as benchmark for "on-time" repayment rate the
ratio of "interest and principal collected during the year" to "in-
terest and principal due during the year." This definition is too lax
and grossly underestimates the severity of the loan collection prob-
lem. Similarly, defining "default rate" as the ratio of "principal
and interest not paid at the end of the loan term" to "total loans
outstanding at the end of each year" also encourages laxity in
loan collection and unnecessarily creates a credit risk because man-
agement loses sight of the need to take immediate remedial action
on nonperforming loans. Thus, at any given time, the MFIs can-
not determine accurately what proportion of their loan portfolios
will be at risk given the incentive for financial indiscipline.
The absence of adequate and sound performance standards
and of a standardized accounting and reporting system also
makes it difficult to evaluate the relative performance of MFIs. A
commercial bank or donor which is willing to invest in
microfinance programs will find it very difficult to assess the
financial position of MFIs. This will result in underinvestment in
potentially rewarding enterprises.
In sum, internal financial policies and practices need a lot of
improvement, particularly in the installation of sound financial re-
porting and monitoring systems, portfolio management, assessmentLLANTOet al.:MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 41
and management of risks, product packaging and pricing, manage-
ment of loan arrears and strategic business planning. Related to these
will be the need to upgrade and institutionalize performance stan-
dards, particularly in loan repayment, appreciation of loan default
and aging of delinquent accounts, and the installation of appropriate
accounting and internal audit systems.
2. Resource mobilization. Viability and sustainability are con-
ditional on the ability of the MFI to mobilize substantial re-
sources which can be leveraged. Despite sound credit practices
and management, the lack of resources, be it in the form of
equity capital, borrowings and deposits, spells the difference
between a self-sustaining MFI and one which is subsidy depen-
dent. _ Earlier, we adverted to several creative and innovative
ways by which MFIs could mobilize resources but the lack of
legal personality and authority hampered the effort. The ab-
sence of prudential regulations to safeguard the interest of the
depositors and shareholders also makes it untenable for creative
ways to mobilize resources.
The inability to mobilize deposits is offset by the access to
cheap funds from external donors and government concessional
loans. Grants and concessional loans are disappearing phenom-
ena in an era of budgetary crunches. The emerging policy and
institutional framework in the country now leans toward reli-
ance on private resources to deliver goods and services to the
public as much as possible, and to the use of scarce grants/
government funds to create an enabling framework for private
institutions to operate more efficiently. It is in this context that
the mobilization of private deposits assumes an important role
in the viability and sustainability of MFIs.
The immediate results of the dependence on grants and
concessional loans are the unwarranted bias for lending and the
failure to develop deposit instruments suitable to poor clients. It
has been argued by some researchers that demand for savings
25.Thesubsidy comes either asgrants orconcessional loans from government/
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and other financial services may even exceed the demand for
credit; thus, an inordinate emphasis on loan provision may be a
disservice to poor people. 26Consequently, the sample MFIs, with
the exception of the sample cooperative rural bank, have not
developed as "full service" financial institutions that could have
provided the poor with better and more financial services. From
the point of view of the MFIs' interest, it can be argued that
"self-sustainability of (rural) financial institutions is based on the
ability to mobilize resources and attain financial viability." 27
Indeed, while the MFIs appear free to craft appropriate finan-
cial and credit policies, they are hamstrung by their meager finan-
cial resources which limit their leverage capacity. Thus, the credit
NGOs depend very much on grants, subsidies and concessional
loans which ultimately undermine their viability and sustainability.
The dependence on donor grants makes their financial and credit
programs donor-driven, i.e., serving the objectives of the fund
source. An immediate effect is the practice of using scarce man-
agement and technical resources for the preparation of proposals
that solicit donor assistance. One MFI even employs two staff
members who do nothing but prepare project proposals which
target particular donors. The ultimate result is that the financial
and credit programs become too sensitive to the biases of project
finance to the neglect of real financial intermediation.
In sum, the MFIs have all attempted to mobilize resources but the
informal character of their organization hampers the effort. Resources
used are mostly grants and subsidies coming from donors and the
government which ironically stunt their growth into viable and sus-
tainable financial intermediaries.
26. This paraphrases Dale Adams, for example, who pointed out that poor
people cannot be made better off with more indebtedness, and that there exists
evidence (e.g. ownership of jewelry and other tangibles) that demand for savings
services outweighs demand for credit.
27. See Sacay and Randhawa (1995). They argue that BAAC attained financial
viability and eliminated subsidy dependence when major steps were taken to generate
more deposits. BAAC found that deposits were a cheaper source of funds than
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3. Management and administration. The management and ad-
ministration of MFIs exert a great influence on their viability and
sustainability. Huge overhead expenses relative to the financial
services delivered erode their profitability and sustainability. What
we saw from the sample data is that the MFIs are generally ineffi-
cient and not cost-effective. They have high management and
overhead expenses relative to the number of clients served and
the volume of business generated. The relative efficiencies of the
sample MFIs are summarized in the various tables of this subsec-
tion. In 1995, the gross return on average loans outstanding ranged
from 8 percent to 36 percent (Table III-12). The performance re-
sults are somewhat mixed, with some MFIs even showing a dete-
rioration as shown by the big drop in this figure recently. The cost
per average peso loan outstanding is relatively very high, espe-
cially for the credit NGOs but with the exception of the sample
cooperative rural bank (Table III-13). A more complete picture of
the cost of delivering the financial services (i.e., loans and savh-Gs
facilities) is shown in Table IiI-14. Only the cooperative rural bank
seems efficient and cost-effective relative to the rest of the sample
MFIs. Available information on relative overhead expenses is cap-
tured in Tables III-15 (number of field staff to head office staff),
III-16 (salaries as a percentage of total financial services) and III-17
(administrative cost per peso of assets).
The huge overhead expenses would have been offset by a
greater number of clients and a wider range of financial prod-
ucts; but with a weak institutional capacity and a small finan-
cial base, this is just not possible at the moment. It is also impor-
tant to note that a reason for the cost-ineffectiveness of credit
NGOs is the lack of consistency between the perceived vision
and mission of the MFI and the actual requirements of the busi-
ness of delivering financial services. While top management is
conscious of the need to be cost-effective and promote financial
discipline in the organization and the clientele being served, the
field staff have difficulty reconciling the social orientation of
their organization's vision and mission with the business side of
financial services delivery. Thus, the field staff give a lot of em-
phasis to training and community organizing rather than the44 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE III-12
Gross Return on Average Loan Outstanding, 1993-1995
MFI 1993 1994 1995
A 0.12 0,19 0.27
B 0.33 0.02 0.08
C 028 0.56 0.34
D 0.27 0.25 0.31
E 0.30 0.28 0.26
F - 0.30 0.27
G 0.16 0.14 0.17
TABLE III-13
Cost Per Average Peso of Loan Outstanding
MFI 1993 1994 1995
A 1.52 1.14 1,30
B 1.21 1.31 1.00
C 1.55 1.10 0.71
D 0.38 0.35 0.48
E 0.21 0.19 0.19
F - 0.38 0.29
G 0.90 0.31 0.34
TABLE III-14
Cost Per Average Peso of Financial Services, 1993-1995
MFI 1993 1994 1995
A 1.11 0.80 1.06
B 0.90 0.92 0.70
C 1.49 1.12 0.70
D 0.61 0.30 0.41
E 0.16 0.16 0.17
F 0.29 0.35 0.27
G 0.81 0.28 0.32LLANTO et al.:MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 45
TABLE III-15
Number of Field Staff to One Head Office Staff
MFI 1993 1994 1995
A 4.00 1.12 1.50
B 4.00 3.00 4.00
C 4.88 5.13 5.80
D 1.14 1.13 1.50
E 4.00 4.00 4.00
F 1.34 1.70 2.00
G 2.50 2.75 2.67
TABLE III-16
Percentage of Salaries to Total Financial Services
MFI 1993 1994 1995
A 44.00 52.00 45.00
B 64.00 46.00 30.00
C 93.00 41.00 29.00
D 11.00 10.00 9.00
E* 2.28 6.57 7.32
F 14.00 16.00 13.00
G 12.40 12.20 7.10
*Grameenreplication program,
TABLE III-17
Administrative Cost Per Peso of Assets
MFI 1993 1994 1995
A 0.32 0.24 0.39
B 0.11 0.11 0.10
C 0.08 0.13 0.13
D 0.16 0.12 0.14
E 0.04 0.07 0.07
F 0.18 0.19 0.12
G 0.30 0.18 0.1246 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
development and packaging of financial products, and other
profitmaking activities. Because training and community orga-
nizing costs are generally activities that generate costs instead of
revenues, overhead expenses increase unless these costs are ab-
sorbed by an external donor or by a government grant.
in sum, the MFIs must streamline their operations by a conscious
cost reduction policy, develop nezo clientele and innovative financial
products, and expand their financial base and outreach capacity.
4. Degree of self-sufficiencay. Most of the sample MFIs are not
operationally self-sufficient, much less financially self-sufficient. In
1995, only one credit NGO was operationally self-sufficient,
although two of them nearly posted operational self-sufficiency
with ratios of 0.66 and 0.67, respectively (Table III-19). The finan-
cial self-sufficiency ratio shows that only the sample cooperative
rural bank became financially self-sufficient, a result which is hardly
surprising, given our analysis of the constraints faced by nonformal
financial intermediaries such as the credit NGOs (Table III-20.)
Attaining full self-sufficiency takes time, and the constraining
impact of the organizational form of the credit NGOs makes this
task arduous. While they effectively target and reach the poor
clientele, they could not be as effective and efficient given their
weak institutional capacity and financial position. These institu-
tions seem capable of continuing with their delivery of financial
services to the poor only because of access to grants and concessional
loans. However, as earlier pointed out, grants and concessional
loans are becoming scarcer as hen's teeth as time goes on. 28
3. Policy, Macro Factors and the Environment
The prevailing growth trend of the economy and the liberal-
ized economic and financial environment augur well for
microfinance programs and the MFIs. A growing economy and
a more competitive financial marketplace will stimulate the de-
28, Only myopic politicians and bureaucrats believe that the barrel of goodies
such as concessional loans is bottomless, but at the expense of taxpayers and deposi-
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TABLE III-18
Debt-Equity Ratio
MFI 1993 1994 1995
A 2.00 2.00 2.00
B 8.00 3.00 2.00
C 0.32 0.86 1190
D 2.10 -
E 2.00 2.60 1.64
F 0.30 0.36 0.49
G 0.89 0.23 -
TABLE III-19
Degree of Operational Self-Sufficiency
MFI 1993 1994 1995
A 0.08 0.17 0.21
B 0.27 0.32 0.08
C 0.18 0.45 0.51
D 0.72 0.72 0.67
E* 1.40 1.45 1.34
F 0.63 0.90 1.13
G 0.22 0.60 0.66
*Grameen.
TABLE III-20
Degree of Financial Self-Sufficiency
MFI 1993 1994 1995
A 0.06 0.17 0.19
B 0.26 0.29 0.07
C 0.17 0.40 0.42
D 0.36 0.78 0.48
E* 0.83 1.22 1.18
F 0.77 0.77 0.93
G __ -- --
*Grameen.48 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
mand for more microfinancial services. A conducive financial
policy environment is essential for improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of MFIs in reaching a greater number of poor people
(see Annex A for a list of recent financial sector reforms).
With interest rate deregulation and a liberal bank entry and
branching policy, there is room for the creation of more MFIs/
branches of MFIs or the transformation of the mature credit
NGOs into formal financial institutions. Another tack is to main-
tain the NGO's social development thrusts and to leave financial
intermediation to a separate organization, i.e., a formal financial
institution that will be organized by the NGO. Alternatively, the
NGO can buy into an existing formal financial institution. This
paper is not the place to evaluate each of these transformation
strategies. However, we would like to think that this strategy
seems to be a realistic approach to the problems of lack of out-
reach, viability and sustainability of many credit NGOs.
Under the present legal and regulatory framework, a credit
NGO can opt to become a bank, credit cooperative or finance
company. These options take advantage of laws already in place
and eliminate the long wait for enabling legislation that will
allow these credit NGOs to mobilize deposits. Only duly autho-
rized banking entities are allowed to mobilize deposits. As for-
mal financial institutions, the credit NGOs will be private and
autonomous institutions that can generate their own equity, mo-
bilize deposits and offer a wider range of financial products to
the target clientele. More specifically, as a bank, they can mobi-
lize deposits from the public; as a credit cooperative or credit
union, they can gather deposits from members.
A common and mistaken argument raised against the pro-
posed transformation of credit NGOs into formal financial insti-
tutions, e.g., as private banks or finance companies duly super-
vised/regulated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, is that they
run the risk of losing their sense of mission for the poor. 29 We
29. One member of the Board of Trustees of a credit NGO which submitted an
application for a banking license resigned on the ground that the NGO has lost its
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argue that this will not necessarily result from such transforma-
tion. On the contrary, doing so would put in place the legal
structure to deal with different clientele, generate additional capi-
tal, and mobilize deposits, thereby strengthening their capacity
to serve the poor. We must distinguish between the organization
and the individuals managing the organization. Thus, losing
one's sense of mission for the poor during or after the transfor-
mation only magnifies what has been there all along--an empty
commitment to the poor.
At present, the credit NGOs operate in a policy vacuum. 3°
There are no clear policies and no supervisory/regulatory frame-
work governing their credit intermediation activities. Since credit
NGOs are not duly authorized banking entities, they cannot
legally mobilize deposits. _1There is no oversight body to super-
vise/regulate their financial activities. Thus, there are neither
performance standards that will be important for monitoring
the financial standing of those organizations nor prudential regu-
lations to protect depositors, creditors, etc. Either the banking or
the credit cooperative route could eliminate the need to reinvent
the wheel of supervision and regulation since the oversight au-
thorities are already in place, namely, the Bangko Sentral for
banks and the Cooperative Development Authority for credit
cooperatives.
There are pressing arguments on why credit NGOs should
consider converting themselves into formal financial entities. The
present deregulated and financial environment has made the
financial markets more dynamic and competitive. There is a
greater number of financial institutions with new and innova-
tive products and financial technologies than the country has
ever seen before. Over time many small unit banks such as the
present rural banks will have grown and transformed them-
30. This paragraph is drawn-from Llanto and Agabin (1996).
31. Cooperatives and credit unions can only mobilize deposits from their own
members. NGOs are reported to have an informal "deposit-taking" relationship with
"members." This is like skating on thin ice because of potential legal sanctions against
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selves into bigger entities which will cater to a different set of
clientele and offer different financial products. The promise of
potential profits and the impact on development will undoubt-
edly attract new formal and informal institutions into the finan-
cial markets. In this context, the credit NGOs are potentially the
formal financial institutions which will address the demand for
financial services of the poor. They can do a better job by being
formal financial institutions, with full powers and authority to
engage in real financial intermediation activities. As Llanto and
Agabin (1996) pointed out, the lessons of experience from other
countries (e.g., Grameen in Bangladesh, BancoSol in Bolivia) show
that the transformation of NGOs into full-fledged formal finan-
cial institutions was a necessary condition for them to be viable
and sustainable in the long term. Lessons from the transforma-
tion suggest that to do otherwise is to continue operating through
donor or government subsidies. In an era of declining subsidies,
the choice seems clear. How many local credit NGOs are ready
to transform themselves into formal financial institutions is cur-
rently unknown. Presently, at least two NGOs have already be-
come rural banks, i.e., those in Nueva Ecija and Zambales prov-
inces, while one is in the preparatory process of becoming one.
Present government policy uses the specialized government
banks to wholesale loans to MFIs, and mandates the People's
Credit and Finance Corporation (PCFC) to assume the responsi-
bility of providing loan funds and technical assistance to im-
prove and strengthen the NGO network of institutions that pro-
motes the Grameen technology. While the loan quotas for in-
tended beneficiaries are still binding on financial institutions,
this legal mandate is currently under review22 The Department
32. The ACPC and the Bankers' Association of the Philippines argue that the
loan quotas, together with other impositions on finarIcial institutions, e.g., gross re-
ceipts tax, serve only to increase the financial intermediation cost, and thus must he
scrapped. Congress has a different view of loan quotas, i.e., those imposed by PD
717 (agri-agra loan quota) and RA 6977 (mandatory lending to small and medium
enterprises). Several bills have been filed to retain them and to eliminate the purchase
of government securities as an alternative mode of compliance with the loan quotas.LLANTO et al.: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 51
of Finance, together with the National Credit Council, is leading
efforts to rationalize the 111 government credit programs which
have been criticized for being inefficient, highly politicized, un-
coordinated and unsustainable. The presence of these credit pro-
grams sends a confusing signal to MFIs and clients alike. While
ostensibly the government promotes savings mobilization and
equity buildup for sustainability, making available highly subsi-
dized credit funds to MFIs erodes the resource mobilization ef-
fort and promotes financial dependence on government.
The Philippine government has also put in place a Social
Reform Agenda with a particular focus on poverty alleviation. It
has also recognized the use of microfinance as an instrument to
alleviate poverty, and has drafted legislation creating the People's
Development Fund to be managed by PCFC for the capacity
building of MFIs. The People's Development Fund will receive
budgetary support from the national government. In addition,
the 1997 budget of the government will include a poverty alle-
viation budget which will be incorporated into the respective
budgetary programs of the designated implementing agencies.
The poverty alleviation budget will be used for livelihood, po-
table water development and sanitation, health and nutrition,
basic child care, environment resource management, basic edu-
cation, resettlement and housing. The government has allocated
P100 million of the poverty alleviation budget for the capability
building of microfinance institutions.
The commercial banks admit their limitations in regard to
microfinance programs. However, the private banking sector can
help create an enabling environment for microfinance. It can
finance rural infrastructure projects; it can also encourage cor-
porate clients to locate their projects in the countryside. 33 On
the other hand, the private sector has also responded by creat-
ing the Punla sa Tao Development Foundation that is a pool of
33. In March 1996 the World Bank sponsored a seminar on innovations in
microfinancing at the AIM. An official from BAP said that "big banks do not have
the skills nor the temperament to deal with the inherent risks that do with
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private funds intended for the capability building of credit NGOs.
Likewise, the two networks of credit NGOs have successfully
worked with donors in raising capability building funds.
The donor community has also provided assistance to NGO
capability building. The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) has approved the funding of a proposal
submitted by a credit NGO and an NGO network for capacity
building of credit NGOs. The Asian Development Bank, together
with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),
has provided the government with a concessional loan and grant
funds for the replication and expansion of the Grameen ap-
proach. More recently, the Australian government received a
proposal for funding a capability building program for NGOs.
On the other hand, several World Bank missions have visited the
country regarding the need for financial sector reforms, e.g.,
development of long-term credit markets, housing finance and
pension funds reforms. A recent World Bank paper encouraged
the government to put in place the appropriate regulatory frame-
work for MFIs and to pay attention to the capability building
needs of these institutions. _
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusions and recommendations address four areas
that will enable MFIs to be self-sustaining financial institutions
serving the poor. These four areas are as follows: (a) outreach and
impact; (b) viability and sustainability; (c) resource mobilization; and
(d) policy.
Outreach and impact. The MFIs are able to reach the poor
because of an effective targeting mechanism which rules out the
leakage of benefits to the nonpoor. A highly motivated field staff
also contributes to effective targeting. The MFIs seem to satisfy
their poor clients' demand for short-term loans (e.g., working
capital); and some even provide the clients with savings facilities.
34. A Strategy to Fight Poverty: The Philippines, The World Bank, 1996.LLANTOet al.:MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 53
However, their outreach is limited to a few thousand clients
because of their weak institutional capacity, small financial base,
high turnover of staff, and high cost of training clients (or social
preparation). A comparison of the performance of the sample
MFIs indicates that only the cooperative rural bank has the ca-
pacity for full financial self-sufficiency. This is not surprising
given the advantages and authority given to a formal financial
institution such as the cooperative rural bank.
To address outreach problems and the lack of a viable and
effective delivery system, it is argued that huge investments in
the creation of NGO branches must be made. A common sensi-
tivity model employed by NGOs indicates that to reach 400,000
borrowers over a five-year period, 300 new branches of present
credit NGOs must be established. Because of the labor-intensive
nature of microfinance lending technology such as the Grameen
approach, some 3,000 field personnel must be trained. This will
require as much as P100 million for branch expansion and train-
ing of new personnel. We believe that to reach a greater number
of poor people in a shorter period of time, P100 million should
be used to train existing, viable and sustainable financial institu-
tions, such as rural banks, cooperative rural banks and credit
cooperatives whose network of branches and unit banks is on a
nationwide scale, on microfinance technologies. This in our mind
is a more cost-effective approach to the problem of outreach and
sustainability of microfinance programs. As Table III-3 shows,
the actual outreach of cooperative rural banks, rural banks and
credit cooperatives is far greater than those of credit NGOs.
Investing in the creation of new branches of NGOs appears to
be more costly and risky than investing in the training of exist-
ing formal financial institutions in microfinance technologies.
The credit NGOs will forever be in a disadvantaged position
compared to other financial institutions. They cannot exercise
the full range of financial intermediation activities. For example,
they lack the legal authority to mobilize deposits, and can only
leverage to a very limited extent their meager fund balances.
Because they are neither finance companies nor nonstock sav-
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their borrowing capacity is limited, making them very depen-
dent on grants and soft loans from the government. This also
adversely affects their viability and sustainability. _"
With respect to the problem of motivation and attitude, the
MFI staff must deal with traditional attitudes that regard credit
to the poor as "social credit" 35leading to inappropriate pricing
of loans, laxity in collection and unsustainable lending programs
(Llanto and Agabin 1996). This view of credit as "social credit"
is an invitation to nonrepayment of the loan because it is "gov-
ernrnent money" to which everyone else is entitled.
This view is reinforced by a proposed law that seeks to cre-
ate a network of "community banks of the poor" to be capital-
ized by the government. The proposed law only serves to
strengthen the attitude that government has to be heavily in-
volved in microfinancial markets to ensure the poor's access to
financial services. Citing as reasons the imperfection of the fi-
nancial market and market failure, proponents of the "commu-
nity bank of the poor" have tried very hard to convince govern-
ment and the legislature to pass the proposed law.
This naive view of the appropriate role of the government in
the financial market ignores the failure of past government in-
tervention in the credit markets through subsidized credit pro-
grams, and the inefficiency and waste of scarce public resources
arising from the present overlapping and duplication of 111 gov-
ernment credit programs. Indeed; government intervention may
be warranted only if the government can demonstrate that it
can do better than the imperfect market, and that the net social
benefits of government intervention are positive.
Thus, the following are recommended:
• transform credit NGOs into full-fledged formal financial in-
stitutions, e.g, private bank, finance company, nonstock sav-
ings and loan association or credit cooperative;
35. This is quite prevalent among politicians who unabashedly promote patron-
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• alternatively, credit NGOs may organize or invest in formal
financial institutions;
• promote linkage banking with private banks which are inter-
ested in providing microfinance services for the poor through
the MFIs whose institutional capacihy must be upgraded;
• invest in training existing rural banks, cooperative rural banks
and credit unions/credit cooperatives in microfinance tech-
nologies;
° externalize the training costs of the poor by allowing MFIs
access to grants and government financial assistance, but fol-
lowing the principle of matching grants with MFI own funds;
° continue staff training and the development of career paths
for capable workers, upgrade pay scales and incentive schemes
to retain good personnel; and
° rationalize government credit programs and reallocate exist-
ing funds for livelihood projects to capacihd building and train-
ing of existing MFIs.
MFI viability and sustainability. To continue providing fi-
nancial services to the poor on a sustained basis, the MFIs them-
selves must be viable and sustainable. The study shows that
many of the MFIs are far from attaining this goal.
The MFIs' viability and sustainability depend first and fore-
most on the nature of their organization and the business and
investment activities which they are allowed to undertake within
the legal and regulatory structure of the country. Any limitation
on their investment and business activities (e.g., prohibition to
mobilize deposits from the public, investment in allied undertak-
ings) constrains profitability and growth. The MFIs have rela-
tively little financial resources which limit their leverage capacity.
The credit NGOs' dependence on grants and subsidies also un-
dermines their viability and sustainability. Thus, they have to
raise more funds and become more efficient credit intermediaries.
The second major factor which determines credit NGOs' vi-
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and organizational practices and procedures. In addition, the
capability for governance, leadership and management affects
their performance. Improvement of management skills and
professionalization of staff, appropriate market-oriented pricing
of financial products and services, and greater effort in loan
recovery are needed to make the MFIs viable and sustainable.
Thus, the key issue is building sustainable institutions by
having (a) the appropriate organizational form; (b) a strong
equity and financial base; and (c) suitable systems and proce-
dures.
The following are recommended:
° build up the equihy base of MFIs by infusing more capital
from existing owners and new investors;
• diversify loans, savings and other financial products/services
according to client demand;
• maximize savings mobilization opportunities;
• promote training in financial operations, resource mobiliza-
tion, portfolio management, risk assessment and management,
product packaging and pricing, management of loan arrears,
strategic and business planning, among others;
° improve systems and procedures such as automating sys-
tems and operating procedures, upgrading and institutional-
izing performance standards, setting up internal audit sys-
tems, conducting periodic management audits, installing an
updated and standardized accounting and reporting system;
and
° professionalize the management and staff of MFIs.
Resource mobilization. The "forgotten" half of finance is
deposit mobilization, 36and this is conveniently forgotten in the
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face of donor grants, subsidized credit funds from government,
and other doleouts. To stay competitive and viable, the MFIs
must raise substantial deposits and develop various instruments,
especially for the small savers, which will help them build up
their financial base. Thus, they not only have to mobilize tradi-
tional deposits but also seek to broaden and deepen the financial
products and services offered to meet existing demand at the
lower end of the financial market. Broadening and deepening
mean the development of new product lines and services, and
the design and implementation of new microfinance technolo-
gies and practices which will strengthen their financial base.
The following are recommended:
• to the MFIs--invest in the development of new product lines
and services, new microjinance technologies, adaptation of the
"best practices in microj_nance," etc., with counterpart fund-
ing from donors and the government;
• to the government--reailocate its resources in various liveli-
hood programs for the broadening and deepening of
microfinancial services; and
° to the donors--allocate resources for the broadening and
deepening of microfinancial services instead of providing loan-
able funds to MFIs.
Policy issues. The necessity of bringing credit NGOs under a
supervisory and regulatory framework cannot be underesti-
matedY Without such a framework, the following problems will
persist: absence of performance standards, lack of uniformity
and dilution of standards of credit evaluation, lack of portfolio
supervision leading to poor loan recovery and deterioration of
its quality and absence of prudential regulations over such ac-
tivities as deposit taking. The installation of a supervisory and
37. The rural banks and cooperative rural banks, finance companies, and credit
unions/cooperatives are already supervised/regulated by the pertinent government
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regulatory framework complements the building of the institu-
tional capacity of MFIs, especially the credit NGOs. In this way,
we will have strong MFIs which will no longer operate in a
policy vacuum.
The alternative to a formal supervisory and regulatory frame-
work is self-regulation by the credit NGOs. The argument goes
that maintaining an informal self-regulatory framework will pro-
vide the credit NGOs with flexibility and room for initiative on
various financial innovations to reach the poor. Furthermore,
there will be no danger of losing focus on their target clientele
which will be brought about by the transformation of credit
NGOs into formal financial institutions. However, the review
made by this study points to the glaring need for performance
standards, prudential regulations, etc., in short, a supervisory/
regulatory framework that will ensure the safety and soundness
of those institutions and the integrity of their transactions. The
argument on losing focus on the poor, as pointed out earlier,
does not hold water. It is because an organization's vision, mis-
sion and goal are not dictated by the organizational structure
(e.g., banking firm) but by the people manning it and the poli-
cies being pursued.
The transformation into formal financial institutions may not
be everybody's cup of tea. It is not for every NGO. There will be
some which will opt for transformation, but there will be others
who will choose to remain as a development agency and, per-
haps, organize a bank with a distinct charter, character and
function. The important outcome of the latter strategy is the
unbundling of banking and development/social preparation func-
tions which will increase efficiencies in the financial markets for
the poor because the (NGO) development agency and the
NGO-organized bank/financial institution can exploit their re-
spective comparative advantage. From the public policy per-
spective, it becomes clearer what activities in microfinance pro-
grams for the poor properly constitute the "social development
costs" and what should rightly be considered "cost of providing
the financial service," i.e., the cost of doing business. The first set
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the externalities present in social training/preparation of poor
clients while the latter should be covered by appropriate pricing
of the financial product. For the social development costs, the
present thrust of raising private monies must be supported.
The following are recommended:
• to the government-provide for an appropriate supervisony
and regulaton d framework for MFIs, especially credit NGOs;
° to the NGOs--maintain a dialogue with the government on
the installation of an appropriate supervisony and regulatony
framework for MFIs,
° to the government--support the costs of social preparation/
training through budgetan d assistance that will be matched
by private sector funds; and
° to donors-provide assistance to social preparation activi-
ties, development of microfinance products, training in
microfinance technologies, and upgrading of performance stan-
dards, operating systems and procedures.60 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
ANNEX A
Policy Measures Before Reform After Reform Date
I. Selective
Credit Control
1. Central Bank Rediscount rate: varies Uniform floating rate for November
rediscount by type of economic all; no prescribed spread. 1985
window activities (allowable
spread: 1%-11%)
Rediscount value: Uniform: 80% November
varies by type of 1985
economic activities
(value: 60%-100%)
2, Central Bank Directly managed Central Bank-managed 1987-1988
Special credit special credit programs special credit programs




New commercial banks -
1. Bank Entry New commercial banks moratorium lifted 1989
- moratorium since
1980; other banks - no
moratorium.
Ten foreign banks allow-
Foreign banks - ed to have 6 branches 1994
no entry since 1949. each; foreign banks may
acquire or establish a
bank up to 60% of the
total equity of each bank.
Branching was liberalized
2. Branching Restrictive branching but the Central Bank May 1989
policy -- the country retained discretionary
was divided into five power with respect to the
service areas; heavily opening of branches in
overbranched areas; certain areas considered
overbranched areas; "overbanked."
ideally branched areas;
underbranched areas; Banks may open branches
and encouraged anywhere they like pro- May 1993
branching areas, vided they meet the
required minimum
capital requirement,LLANTO et al.: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 61
ANNEX A (CONTINUED)
Policy Measures Before Reform After Reform Date
3. Government Largely doing lending More focus on wholesale since 1987
Banks that directly competes lending using private
with private banks, banks as conduits.
4. Interest Rates
a, Deposit




banks No cap since 1983 same 1987





officerships between banks 1986
or between a bank and a
nonbank financial interme-
diary except with prior
approval of the Monetary
Board.
Requiring each bank to December
cause an annual financial 1986
audit to be conducted by
an external independent
auditor not later than 30
days after the close of
the calendar year.
Requiring all banks and December
nonbank financial inter- 1987
mediaries to adopt the
Statements of Financial
Accounting Standards.
The Central Bank declared May 1989
a policy that it shall refrain
from sustaining weak
banks, except in times of
general financial emergency
or when specific banks face
problems of liquidity rather
than of solvency.62 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
ANNEX A (CONTINUED)
Policy Measures Before Reform After Reform Date
Including contingent June 1993
liabilities in the
determination of the
limit to which banks
can lend to a single
borrower or a group of
affiliated borrowers.
Deposits of insider- Insider-borrower shah
borrower were pro- waive the secrecy of
tected by the Secrecy their deposits for










Thrift banks - P150M




1_ Foreign On-floor Off-floor through an December
exchange electronic screened 1992




2. Export Mandatory surrender Foreign exchange September
receipts of foreign exchange earners may retain 1992





3_ Foreign Limits on foreign No limit. September
exchange exchange purchases 1992
purchases such as travel,
•educational
expenses, etc.LLANTO et al.: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 63
ANNEX A (CONTINUED)
Policy Measures Before Reform After Reform Date
4. Repatriation Staggered from 3-9 Full and immediate September
and remit- years subject to repatriation without 1992
tances of Central Bank Central Bank approval
investments approval, for foreign investments
duly registered with
the Central Bank or
custodian bank.
5. Outward in- Not allowed. Allowed initially up to 1992-1994
vestment by US$1M, but lately
residents increased to USS6M.
6. Access to No access. Direct exporters September
domestic allowed access 1992
FCDU loans.
Indirect exporters July 1994
allowed access
Source: Lamberte and Llanto (1995).
ACRONYMS
ACPC Agricultural Credit Policy Council
BAAC Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative
BAP Bankers Association of the Philippines
BCGC BAP Credit Guaranty Corporation
BSP Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
BWYW Bureau of Women and Young Workers
CARP Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
CDA Cooperative Development Authority
CRBs Cooperative Rural Banks
DA Department of Agriculture
DAR Department of Agrarian Reform
DOLE Department of Labor and Employment
DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
GDP Gross Domestic Product64 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
GNP Gross National Product
IC Insurance Commission
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
LBP Land Bank of the Philippines
MCP Microcredit Project
MFIs Microfinance institutions
NBFIs Nonbank Financial Intermediaries
NLSF National Livelihood Support Fund
NGOs Nongovernmental Organizations
PCFC People's Credit and Finance Corporation
PCFP Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty
POs People's Organizations
SRA Social Reform Agenda
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WEED Women Workers Development and Entrepreneurship
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